

**Race and
Arab Americans
Before and After
9/11**

**FROM INVISIBLE CITIZENS
TO VISIBLE SUBJECTS**

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Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in the *New York Times*, Before and After 9/11

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SINCE THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, Arabs and Muslims in general and Arab American and Muslim American citizens by association and by direct action have become increasingly targeted for discriminatory policies and practices in the United States, fueled by the "war on terrorism" media frenzy. We live in dangerous times, the media and public authorities drum daily. No threat is more imminent than that of Islam, no site more at risk than the American homeland, and no enemy more fearful than the enemy within, we are told.

The media mantra of the urgent threat of Islam and of the Arabs and Muslims who transport it travels through numerous pathways. Of interest to this project is the manner in which respected print news media increasingly reflect and reproduce racialization of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. This paper examines how the *New York Times* (NYT), arguably the most influential U.S. newspaper and one of the most influential newspapers in the world, narrates Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in ways that result from and enable racial policing by associating them with terrorism and a demonized, globalized Islam. That the NYT is widely considered a "liberal" newspaper, known for advocacy of civil and human rights, makes it a critical site for examining the representation of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in print news media.

Following September 11, 2001, contradictions in the ideals and practices of citizenship in the United States increasingly came to the fore, with Arab

Americans and Muslim Americans becoming the most visible site of these contradictions. Tensions in the constitution of the body politic were projected onto the U.S. citizenship of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, as the war on terrorism took the appearance of a war on "Muslim terrorism." While the trope of the "violent Muslim" has a long history, rooted in imperialist and orientalist representations, it has appeared with greater force and persistence since 9/11.

Since the attacks, Arabs and Muslims have been frequently represented in the United States media as "other." The subtext of such depictions appears to be that one cannot be Arab or Muslim and American at the same time; that being both, one is neither and therefore not quite a citizen; that the hyphen between Arab or Muslim and American is not quite attached (Joseph 1999a). The print news media have increasingly represented Muslim Americans and Arab Americans as if they are not true members of the body politic, not quite part of the national community. The marginalization of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans prompted the Council on American-Islamic Relations to place numerous ads in the *NYT* in the aftermath of 9/11 with photographs of Muslims of all ethnicities and colors, declaring them to be "American."

We argue in this chapter that while the rhetorical maneuvers we discovered in the *NYT* are at times explicitly racial in their grammar, their organization of racial investments through other categories, such as religion, ethnicity, and nation, have the effect of racializing religion, ethnicity, and nation. Our understandings of race, racialization, and racism are informed by the work of Michael Omi, Howard Winant, and Etienne Balibar. In *Racial Formation*, Omi and Winant state:

We define racial formation as the social historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed. . . . First, we argue that racial formation is a process of historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized. Next we link racial formation to the evolution of hegemony, the way in which society is organized and ruled. (Omi and Winant 1994, 55–56)

The concept of racial formation focuses attention on the constructed, shifting, and contingent character of race, racial identification, and ascriptions. Racial categories are continually reconstituted, materially, and discursively, through structure and representation. Race is made and remade through polyvalent

circuits that organize meaning, power, and resources. For Omi and Winant, racial projects, the activities through which race and racialization function, operate at the intersection of cultural representation and socioeconomic structure and are the building blocks of racial formation. Conglomerations of racial projects, sets of racialized meanings, structures, identifications and disidentifications, can be understood as racial formations.¹

We argue that the *NYT*, taken as a representational apparatus, has contributed significantly to the project of racializing Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. We do not mean to argue that the *NYT* dictates how its readers view race. Rather, it is one representational apparatus that contributes to racialization and takes on the effect of a racial project. It is situated within larger, constantly reconstituted arrays of racial projects and formations. In critically reading race in *NYT* articles, it is important to bear in mind that

[t]he effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and "decentered" complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. With this in mind, let us propose a definition: race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies. (Omi and Winant 1994, 55)

In *NYT* articles, the social conflicts, meanings, and interests are staged and encoded through the language and imagery of racial embodiment.

We refine Omi and Winant's analysis to argue that it is not merely different types of human bodies that are signified. Omi and Winant do not consider the international character of racial formation. Because national categories are racialized in U.S. discourse, race may signify categories other than, but related to the order of, human bodies. Race may refer to or be referenced through the categories of nation, sexuality, gender, class, religion, ethnicity, or language.

1. Omi and Winant argue that: "An alternative approach is to think of racial formation processes as occurring through a linkage between structure and representation. Racial projects do the ideological "work" of making these links. A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular lines. Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning" (Omi and Winant 1994, 56).

Here, Etienne Balibar's theorizing of race offers some important amendments to Omi and Winant. Balibar considers race a "transnational phenomenon" (1991, 17). Like Omi and Winant, he sees race as both a matter of cultural representation and a material structure.² For Balibar, as it is for Omi and Winant, racism has to do with essentialism and hierarchy, stereotypes and the construction of Otherness. Balibar's reflections on racism add to Omi and Winant's by addressing how racialization and racism may operate through categories not specifically named as race, such as immigration and religion: "The functioning of the category of immigration as a substitute for the notion of race and a solvent of 'class consciousness' provides us with a first clue" (20). Placing immigration at the center of his account of race, Balibar treats race as a transnational phenomenon having to do with colonial genealogies. Drawing on P. A. Taguieff, Balibar analyzes differentialist racism—a new racism from the era of decolonization that focuses on cultural rather than biological differences.³

Theorizing differentialist racism, which operates through the tools of essentialism, allows us to analyze race beyond discourses of phenotype, while not disregarding moments in which discourses of phenotype still operate. Cul-

2. Balibar argues that: "Racism—a true 'total social phenomenon'—inscribes itself in practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantasm of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve 'one's own' or 'our' identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated around stigmata or otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices). It therefore organizes affects . . . by conferring upon them a stereotyped form, as regards both their 'objects' and their 'subjects'. It is this combination of practices, discourses and representations in a network of affective stereotypes which enables us to give an account of the formation of a racist community" (1991, 17–18).

3. Balibar describes the new differentialist racism: "The new racism is a racism of the era of 'decolonization,' of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. Ideologically, current racism, which France centres upon the immigration complex, fits into a framework of 'racism without races' which is already widely developed in other countries, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological or heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P. A. Taguieff has rightly called a *differentialist racism*." (Balibar 1991, 21).

ture bears the marks of natural essentialism in ways that allow it to do work imagined in the discourse of phenotype.⁴ The work of differentialist racism is to construct essential cultural difference; to mark cultural distinctness as homogenous, static, and embedded; to install boundaries between cultures; and to reproduce and represent a hierarchy of cultures based on the essentialization of cultural difference.⁵ The NYT articles that we examined often contribute to a racial project through their essentializing of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans as culturally distinct from the "rest" of America, their direct and indirect assertions of impenetrable difference, and their implied judgment that the "culture" of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans is not only incongruent with "American" culture, but also suspect.⁶ In many instances, the modes of racialization discursively enacted enhance the social space from which further racializing processes and racial projects beyond NYT may be enabled. The articles highlighted below, we argue, are complicit in building racial hegemony.

This chapter documents discursive processes by which religion, immigration, ethnicity, language, space, gender, and sexuality become racialized and constitute racialized subjects. Our research investigates word choices, rhetorical moves, and thematic patterns that, by racializing Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, make them problematic to the U.S. nation-state. It closely examines the *New York Times's* representations of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the racializing effects of those representations. Given the national and international platforms on which the *New York Times* operates, how it represents a subject is of tremendous impor-

4. Balibar suggests that, "culture can also function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and intangible in origin" (1991, 22).

5. According to Balibar, differentialist ideology presents itself as an explanatory framework for racism: "In fact, what we see is a general displacement of the problematic. We now move from the theory of races or the struggle between the races in human history, whether based on biological or psychological principles, to a theory of 'race relations' within society, which *naturalizes not racial belonging but racist conduct*." (1991, 22–23).

6. Omi and Winant relate racism to essentializing processes: "A racial project can be defined as *racist* if and only if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race*. . . . Our definition therefore focuses instead on the 'work' essentialism does for domination, and the 'need' domination displays to essentialize the subordinated" (1994, 71).

tance to the subject and to the public discourse related to the subject—nation-wide and worldwide.

We argue first that the *NYT* represents Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in a manner that mostly operates to differentiate them from other Americans. The ordinariness of and internal differences among Arab Americans and Muslim Americans is at times subtly and at times crassly subverted through a series of direct and indirect associations and representations, the effects of which are to essentialize and racialize Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and represent them in their “collective,” essentialized identities, rather than their individualities or differences. Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are portrayed largely as Muslim, even though the overwhelming majority of Arab Americans were Christian until the 1970s and many experts say that Christians are still the majority among Arab Americans (Arab American Institute [AAI] 2006; Samhan 2005). And Muslim Americans are represented as largely Arab, even though Arabs are a minority of the Muslims in America—and in the world. The largest group of Muslim Americans is African American and the largest group of Muslims globally is South Asian.

Second, Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are represented as intimately tied to their countries of origin, more so than other immigrants and more tied to their countries of origin than they are to the United States. Third, Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are represented as highly religious, and more religious than most Americans. Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are represented as religiously devout Muslims. Fourth, devout Muslims are represented as devoted to Islam and other Muslims before they are devoted to the United States and other Americans. Fifth, through a series of associations, Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are portrayed as linked to international Muslims and Muslim movements, which are themselves racialized as dark and dangerous. Sixth, Muslims around the world are represented primarily in terms of their religious devoutness. That devoutness is represented as being thinly differentiated from religious fanaticism. Fanaticism is discussed as the character of people who are trained primarily for collective identity rather than for individuality. Seventh, the “irrational religious rage” of Islamic fanaticism against the United States emerges as a thin veil separating the hearts and heartbeats of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans from globalized Islamic fanaticism and terrorism. Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, in this rhetorical maneuver, are transformed into high-risk citizens, subtly justifying indiscriminate

violation of the civil rights of, as well as possible violence against, a vibrant part of the body politic.

The *NYT* articles that we analyzed for this paper were selected from the period 2000 through 2004. We constructed our article pool using the database ProQuest Current Newspaper, which contains full-text articles from the *New York Times*. Using the ProQuest Current Newspaper database, we searched for the following keywords: “Arab American,” “Arab,” “Muslims,” “Muslim American,” “Middle East American,” and “Islam.” Additionally, we searched for specific Arab American identity categories that referenced predominantly Arab countries. For example: “Egyptian American,” “Yemeni American,” “Moroccan American,” “Libyan American,” and so on. Of all the Arab American subgroups, only “Egyptian American,” “Yemeni American,” “Jordanian American,” “Syrian American,” “Lebanese American,” and “Saudi American” yielded articles. Of the articles generated from the Proquest search, we selected those that were specifically about Arab Americans and Muslim Americans rather than articles about the Middle East or articles in which Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are only peripherally referenced. We obtained a pool of articles that can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of 279 articles about Arab Americans, Arabs in the United States, Muslim Americans, and/or Muslims in the United States. As we proceeded with the downloading, we discovered the important rhetorical linkage between Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and the coverage of Muslims globally. We began to select those articles that focused on Muslims outside the United States, calling this category, “Islam Globally.” In this second category, we examined 90 articles. These 90 articles do not exhaust the articles printed in the *NYT* during this period on Muslims outside the United States. However, the articles downloaded and considered here appear to capture a range of discursive representations in the *NYT* that critically link Arab Americans and Muslim Americans to Muslims internationally.

We selected articles ranging from September 2001 to May 2004 to explicate the representational patterns we found in *New York Times* articles spanning January 2000 to December 2004. Through close textual readings of individual *NYT* articles, we document the discursive processes by which *NYT* representations essentialize and differentiate Arab Americans and Muslim Americans from other Americans. Although it is not possible to exhibit the full range of representations that appear in the *NYT*, we demonstrate how several important

patterns organize *NYT* representations of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and the racializing strategies that structure those representations.⁷

ESSENTIALIZING ARAB/MUSLIM AMERICANS

Racialization processes create racial categories by constructing distinct racial groups (based on phenotype, culture, or religion), within which difference is homogenized and between which difference is emphasized. Inasmuch as the *New York Times* presents Arab Americans and Muslim Americans in their "collective identity" rather than their individualities, Arab American and Muslim American identities are essentialized, facilitating the racializing project. Internal differences among Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are further glossed by the depiction of all Arab Americans as Muslims and all Muslim Americans as Arab. Indeed, in the *NYT* rhetoric the operative category appears to be "Arab/Muslim" Americans, as if "Arab" and "Muslim" were one and the same.

The *New York Times* often titles articles to suggest they are about Arab Americans when the text concerns non-Arab peoples. An article by Matthew Purdy provides an example. The title of Purdy's September 14, 2001, article, "For Arab-Americans, Flag-Flying and Fear," suggests a story about Arab Americans, but the story that follows is about Pakistani Americans. It discusses Muslims generally, but not the "Arab-Americans" mentioned in the title. At no point in the article does Purdy clarify that Pakistanis are not Arabs. Describing events post-9/11, Purdy quotes a concerned mosque president speaking about the plane assaults: "I hoped it's not someone from the Muslim community." Purdy does not make clear why all Arab Americans would necessarily be concerned about the Muslim community, a point that needs to be interrogated, given that scholars generally agree that the majority of Arab Americans are Christian. The "Muslim community" and "Arab Americans" are assumed to be one, in Purdy's article. Purdy describes another man whose brother was harassed while wearing "Pakistani

7. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the frequency with which articles appear that exhibit the patterns we examine. In order to demonstrate that *New York Times* articles are most often fixated on the particular themes we suggest recur, we compiled quantitative data, to show which words or types of words are used most frequently to construct *NYT* articles. As part of a future paper, we intend to publish the quantitative data we compiled on the *NYT*.

clothes." Purdy does not explain whether this second man is Pakistani, an Arab American wearing "Pakistani clothes," a mixed-heritage person of Pakistani and Arab descent, or none of the above. The connection between the harassment of a man dressed in Pakistani clothes and the Arab Americans alluded to in the title appears not to merit explanation for Purdy, eliding the differences between Arab Americans and Muslim Americans.

A similar conflation is evidenced in Laurie Goodstein and Gustav Niebuhr's September 14, 2001, piece, "Attacks and Harassment of Arab Americans Increase." Goodstein and Niebuhr's article discusses people of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, while placing Sikhs, Pakistanis, and Afghans, under the sign "Arab." The article's title enables audiences, who may be unaware of religious, ethnic, national, and geographic distinctions, to conflate these diverse peoples into a homogenized and inaccurately conceived Arab American identity. Goodstein and Niebuhr's conflation of groups under the heading "Arab American" seems to rest upon the belief that the groups in question look alike: "People of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent—or even those who appear to be—are increasingly becoming targets of harassment and violence by civilians and of intense scrutiny by police officers under pressure to track down suspects in the terrorist attacks." While people of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent have faced and do face harassment, the title of the article leads the reader to assume they can all be glossed as Arab Americans. One of the article's informants, a chief of police in Providence, states that four "Arabic males" are being searched out as suspects in relation to 9/11. Naming a suspect group "Arabic males" discursively genders and racializes a category for police practice.⁸ We are not told how the search for "Arabic males" casts suspicion upon all people of Middle Eastern (who are not all Arab) and South Asian (who are not Arab) descent. This elision does more than normalize the conflation of diverse communities. It works to instruct and prepare them collectively for policing.

Appearing on September 14, 2003, Marjorie Connelly's article, "There's Still a Chill in New York for Arab-Americans, Poll Says," reports the "singling out"

8. Clearly the article's authors and informants evidence some confusion as to which group or groups they are discussing. In any case, it is improper to speak of "Arabic males"; to refer to men whose heritage is Arab, one would say "Arab males," not "Arabic males," for people are Arab, not Arabic.

of "Arab-Americans, Muslims, and immigrants from the Middle East." The story's text seems to render Muslim, Arab, and Pakistani identities as the same:

Typical of those who think Arabs are targets for discrimination is Shirley Haq, who came to the United States from Pakistan as a child. "As soon as people hear you are a Muslim," Ms. Haq, a 38-year-old real estate agent who lives in Manor Heights, Staten Island, said in a follow-up interview, "you hear comments about who Muslims are and what they do."

Connelly translates Ms. Haq's comments about Muslims into comments about Arabs, eschewing the identities of Muslims of Pakistani and other non-Arab descent. A racialized regime of seeing, evinced in Connelly's article, posits an essentialized phenotype on the bodies of all people of Arab and/or Muslim descent.

"A friend of mine feels under pressure because he is a Muslim," said Renzo Balducci, a computer scientist who lives in Carroll Gardens, Brooklyn. "When meeting people, he looks obviously like a Middle Eastern man and feels a bit of coldness." But Mr. Balducci regards such singling out as unavoidable these days. "It's quite natural," he said. "In the news, Muslims are seen daily as being connected with acts of violence in all the current events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and so on."

Mr. Balducci's statement seems to imply that Muslimness and Middle Easternness appear on bodies. The article presumes that there is a discernable "Muslim look" or "Middle Eastern look." The assumption that Middle Easternness and Muslimness are bodily manifestations which can be readily observed accompanies a discourse in which "singling out" is banalized, called "quite natural" and "unavoidable." Here, it is clear that an imagined Muslim/Middle Eastern

9. The crux and context of Connelly's story is a poll that "found New Yorkers divided on the question of whether Arab Americans look upon terrorists with understanding. About a third of New Yorkers said Arab Americans were more sympathetic to terrorism than other American citizens; 44 percent said they were not. A citywide poll taken a month after the September 11 attacks found virtually the same result" (Connelly 2003). Reporting on the sentiments of "New Yorkers" toward "Arab Americans," Connelly's article proposes these as distinct categories, appearing unaware of the fact that quite a few New Yorkers are Arab Americans.

appearance or look and the contempt for persons so imagined is enabled by and creates the terms of legibility for a link between Muslims and violence.

Even when attempting to specifically portray the diversity of Arab Americans, *NYT* writers often stumble. In a February 17, 2004, article entitled "Arabs in U.S. Raising Money to Back Bush," Leslie Wayne writes: "Arab-Americans are not a monolithic group. The term is used generally to refer to people from Arab countries, but they may have diverse religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, like Lebanese and other Arab Christians or Muslims from Egypt and Pakistan." Wayne's definition of Arabs not only erroneously includes Pakistanis but also Iranians: "The fund-raisers are people like Mori Hosseini, the Iranian-born chief executive of ICI Homes, a home builder in Daytona Beach, Fla." Wayne continues, "Mr. Hosseini's enthusiasm runs counter to what some polls say is a drop in Mr. Bush's popularity among Arab-Americans"—implying that this Iranian-born chief executive is an Arab American.

Muslim Americans are, again, collapsed as Arab Americans in a blithe definition of the American Muslim Alliance, found in an article by Francis X. Clines (Oct. 3, 2001). Clines characterized the American Muslim Alliance as "the main organization devoted to the political assimilation of the nation's seven million Arab-Americans." The seven million figure is the high-end figure usually given for all Muslim Americans, including African Americans (the largest single group of Muslim Americans), and people from India, Indonesia, Eastern Europe, China, Malaysia, and other countries. By asserting the category "Arab" to signify all "Muslim Americans," Clines deploys Arabness as a primary racialization tool. Arabness becomes the sign of racial Otherness organizing the identity "Muslim."

Just as Muslim identity is marked as Arab, Arab identity is assumed to be Muslim. In "Islam Attracts Converts by the Thousands, Drawn Before and After Attacks," from October 22, 2001, Jodi Wilgoren narrates:

Nine years ago, Jim Hacking was in training to be a Jesuit priest. Now, he is an admiralty lawyer in St. Louis who has spent much of the last month explaining Islam at interfaith gatherings. Mr. Hacking's search began in the 12-step program Overeaters Anonymous and intensified when he befriended an Egyptian-born woman, Amany Ragab, at the law review at St. Louis University. He made the Shahadah on June 6, 1998, and proposed marriage to her the next day. This summer, the couple traveled to Mecca.

Wilgoren appears content to conclude that Amany Ragab is Muslim simply by asserting that she is "Egyptian-born." This narrative effaces the identity of the over 15 percent of Egyptians who are Coptic Christian. Additionally, it seems to assume that his "befriending" an Egyptian-born woman is an adequate explanation of why he would convert to Islam. It implies a sexual seduction of white men by racialized Muslim women. This motif is a particularly effective racializing maneuver in the American context given the dominant narratives of U.S. race relations within which white men are frequently represented as seduced by black women.¹⁰ The creation of the category, the seductive Muslim woman, is a homogenizing move that imagines Muslims and Arabs as the same. By conjuring the image of Arab women spreading Islam through sexual relations, it evokes the sexualized and racialized hierarchy of American cultural politics.

THE DANGER OF DIVIDED LOYALTIES

The second pattern we found was that Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are represented in many *NYT* articles as intimately tied to their countries of origin, perhaps more so than they are to the United States—and more tied to their countries of origin than are other American immigrant groups. Indeed, there is the implication that Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are more closely affiliated with Arab or Muslim countries in general, regardless of their specific ancestry, than they are to the United States. Laurie Goodstein's September 12, 2001, article, "In U.S. Echoes of Rift of Muslims and Jews," connected the 9/11 attacks to Muslims and Arab Americans, while it linked the events' significance to Israel and Palestine.

Even though there was no definitive information yet about who was behind the terrorist attacks that struck New York City and Washington yesterday,

10. Under American slavery, racist and sexist ideology attempted to justify the rape of black women by white men through the myth of the aggressive and corrupting sexual character of black women. According to Hazel V. Carby, "Confronted by the black woman, the white man behaved in a manner that was considered to be entirely untempered by any virtuous qualities; the white male, in fact, was represented as being merely prey to the rampant sexuality of his female slaves" (1987, 27). See also Aptheker (1982); Collins (1991); Davis (1981); hooks (1981); and White (1985).

Muslims and Arab-Americans in the New York region and across the country immediately braced for the backlash with the grim panic of students rehearsing a duck-and-cover, air-raid drill.

A terrorist attack on the United States detonates particular repercussions here among both Muslims and Jews, whose kin in the Middle East are locked in a bitter battle that many people immediately assume has now arrived like an unwelcome immigrant on American shores.

In the face of suspicion and discrimination, Muslims struggled to assert their identities as loyal American citizens and to say that their religion does not approve of violence against innocents. Jews, meanwhile, could not help linking the victimization of Americans to that of Jews in Israel.

Goodstein's narrative figures Muslims and Arab Americans as having anticipated blame for "who was behind the terrorist attacks"—as if they knew already. Her choice of words approximates violence as she asserts that the attack "detonates particular repercussions." The effect is to spread rhetorically the affective link to physical detonation. Next she glosses all American Muslims and Jews as being Middle Eastern by claiming that "[B]oth Muslims and Jews" have "kin in the Middle East." Doing this, she misrepresents the reality that most U.S. Muslims and Jews are not Middle Eastern and do not have relatives in the Middle East. Stating that the "bitter battle that many people immediately assume has now arrived like an unwelcome immigrant on American shores," she immediately makes clear in the next sentence that it is the Muslims who have to prove that they are worthy, "loyal" American citizens. Thus they must be the unwelcome immigrants. Jews, she implies, are like "us," identifying the "victimization of Americans to that of Jews in Israel." This maneuver also homogenizes Jews, but does so by folding them into the U.S. cultural "us."

The article positions Muslim Americans as needing to defend Islam and their claims to Americanness; they "struggle" to assert their loyalty as Americans. Jewish Americans, on the other hand, are portrayed sympathetically, revictimized by terrorism that is defined as Arab and Muslim. Whereas the American national statuses of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans (the narrative slips between the two groups) are called into question by events of September 11, the "Americanness" of Jews is affirmed by those same events. Muslims are discursively routed and rooted to the Middle East, destabilizing their U.S. citizenship claims; Jews are linked with the Middle East in a way that articulates their

community with the U.S. nation. Thus U.S. Arab Muslims are linked to "bad" Palestinians and white Americans to "good" Jews.

Representations of Arab Americans often question Arab Americans' loyalty to the United States by questioning their stances on U.S. foreign policy. Patricia Cohen's September 29, 2001, article, "Response to Attacks Splits Arabs in the West," approaches the question of loyalty by taking issue with opinions of "Arab intellectuals in the West" vis-à-vis the causes of so-called "virulent radicalism" and "murderous attack."

Since the end of the First World War when the French and British willy-nilly carved up the decaying Ottoman Empire, people have been divided over who is to blame for the veil of misery that shrouds millions of people across the Arab world.

Are outsiders or insiders, Westerners or Arabs primarily responsible for the persistent poverty, corruption and repression? The question has been bubbling up since Sept. 11, as people grope to explain the virulent radicalism that has been growing across the region. For while a single madman can be dismissed as an evil aberration, what intelligence reports describe as a sprawling army of nearly 11,000 cannot.

Among Arab intellectuals educated and living in the West, who are at once both outsiders and insiders, the question is particularly pointed. Revulsion at the murderous attack has brought a moment of unity here. (In the Arab world it is not hard to hear voices calling the attack justified retribution.) Across continents Arab writers and scholars have been e-mailing one another vehement condemnations.

By labeling "Arab intellectuals in the West" as "both outsiders and insiders," who are split on whether to blame U.S. policies or Arab governments, Cohen implies one cannot be both Arab and Western. That Arab intellectuals must "choose sides" amidst "suspicion over loyalties and motives" implies that there is uncertainty about the trustworthiness of Arabs as U.S. citizens. "Virulent radicalism," outside the U.S. body politic, she says has a "sprawling army," which apparently emanates from the "veil of misery that shrouds millions of people across the Arab world." It is a world that seeks "retribution" against the United States. By invoking a "veil of misery that shrouds," the "Arab world" is constructed in terms of feminine difference marked by subordination. The veil comes to signify mysteriousness and oppression that may be the fault of Arabs.

Cohen's narrative segues into a domestic narrative of infantile sibling rivalry over geographic loyalties.

But the attack has also created new pressures to choose sides within a group that is at times wrung with suspicion over loyalties and motives. Now, like feuding brothers who etch a chalk line across their bedroom floor Arab intellectuals in the West are split over how to respond to the attack. All are horrified at the senseless deaths. But on one side are those who argue that it is essential to understand how United States policies helped create the conditions that produced such monstrous fanatics. On the other are those who insist that any attempts to link the attacks to grievances against the West play into terrorist hands.

In using the familial metaphor and citing the feud among the brothers in the domestic space of the bedroom, Cohen reinstates the frequently used trope of the dysfunctional Arab family. These brothers are given a choice—side with the U.S. government, be a part of the U.S. state household, or side with "an evil aberration," "a sprawling army of nearly 11,000." To side with evil is to rebel against the patriarchal law of the state's house. To defer to the state is to be loyal to the patriarchal law. In Cohen's scenario, the feuding brothers, Arab intellectuals in the West, represent racialized dysfunctionality. They are thus figures to be corrected, disciplined, and punished as naughty children.

As Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai point out, the figure of the terrorist is a rearticulation and rejuvenation of the monster trope, a trope that co-evolved with colonialism and has long been established in the Western imagination. As a technology of governmentality, the monster-figure constructs both the subject to be punished and the subject to be corrected (Puar and Rai 2002). The imagined monster figure is the evildoer, the racialized and sexualized enemy that cannot possibly be the citizen. Racialization of subjects through the monster frame enacts a disciplining, whereby patriotism to the U.S. imperial racial state is required of subjects if they are to dissociate themselves from the monster image. In the above quote from Cohen, failed adult status, linked to a split group psyche, is produced and managed through the construction of a binary between those who align with U.S. state interests and those who do not.

Familial division reoccurs as a theme describing divided loyalties. In an October 29, 2001, article entitled "A Family, Both Arab and Arab-American, Divided by a War," Susan Sachs and Blaine Harden note "a perceptual chasm

that is widening between Arabs and Americans . . . the pressure under which many Arab-Americans, torn between old family and new flag, must now live." The idea of a chasm between Arabs and Americans questions the citizenship of Arab Americans by juxtaposing family and flag. The new flag represents the new, modern United States.¹¹ The Arab family is presented as old, before entry into modern (U.S. national) time. This binary of family/old versus flag/new nation not only rehearses the modernization discourse of family loyalty as primordial/primitive and national loyalty as modern/progressive but also implies that those who continue to embrace familial loyalty are suspect citizens. The presence of the flag enacts both a pedagogical and a disciplining action.

Deploying flags in a spatial and temporal framing that raises the question of loyalty, Matthew Purdy's April 7, 2002, article, "On Arab-America's Main Street, New Flags and Old Loyalties," focuses primarily on "a fund-raiser for a congressman organized by Arab-American professionals." The theme of split loyalties is prevalent in this story about one Mr. El Filali, who engages in pro-Palestinian activities by day and support for U.S. congressional representatives by night. The article points out how U.S. flags get trumped by larger Palestinian flags. Waving Palestinian flags is called a form of "abandon," implying irrationality, possibly fanaticism. Purdy calls such activities "contradictory . . . after Sept. 11." Another Arab American's "bond with America," Purdy says, "grew hideously stronger after Sept. 11." What might be hideous about an Arab American's bond with the United States? The man in question, Mr. Merhi, had lost a godson in the September 11 attacks. After 9/11, mainstream media discourse often proclaimed the bond between U.S. nation and citizen as one of pride, continuity, and internal cohesion in the face of an external threat. Mr. Merhi's bond to the U.S. nation is, however, considered troubling to the point of hideousness, likening him to the monster, the enemy within that disfigures the body politic. The deployment of the word "hideous" positions Arab Americans' loyalties to the United States as disturbing aberrations. Purdy suggests there may be underlying

11. According to Anne McClintock, flags are types of national fetish objects, deployed as liminal markers to manage racial, gender, class, sexual, and national contradictions. For McClintock, fetishistic spectacles serve as an organizing mechanism for nationalist projects. Fetishism facilitates the teleology of the nation by providing a conduit to invoke, frame, transfer, and/or disavow difference and power relations. In this instance, the flag serves as a modern(izing) symbol held against the backdrop of atavistic, familial, antinational forms (1995).

"tension within the hyphenated identities." When, at the end of the article, an aide to Congressman Pascall is quoted as saying Mr. Merhi made comments that were "over the line" regarding Palestine and Israel, the narrative of hideousness, hyphenation, and temporally/spatially distant loyalties merge to situate Arab Americans as marginal American citizen.

The representation of Arab Americans as tied to their countries of origin takes on a specific spatial component that racializes and links subjects' bodies and cultural geographies. Appearing on November 4, 2001, "Struggling to Be Both Arab and American," by Jodi Wilgoren, discussing Arab Americans in Dearborn, Michigan, exhibits a profound anxiety about space. Arab Americans' in-between or hyphenated identity status is inscribed with the space of transnational migration: "Yet even as Arab Americans claim their place, the alienation is obvious. In dozens of conversations, with new 'boaters' who have been here a few months and those whose families have stayed for generations, people here inadvertently but consistently refer to non-Arabs as 'Americans'" (Wilgoren 2001a). In this racializing anti-immigrant discourse, the term "boaters" implies illegality, usually referring to Central American, Caribbean, and other adjacent migrants to the United States. Present-day Arab immigrants do not travel to the United States by boat. "Boaters" places Arab Americans in a genealogy of racializing discourse aimed at illegal immigrants. Labeling Arab American immigrants "boaters," Wilgoren fixes migration as a permanent status, disallowing for a grounded identity in the nation. Even Arab Americans who are long-term citizens are articulated within the same frame as boaters. "Middle Eastern people outside the Middle East" constructs Arab Americans as anchored to the Middle East, foreclosing the possibility for them to fully inhabit citizen space within the American polity.

Wilgoren continues to mark Dearborn as a cultural, political, and sexual space apart from America: "As their culture permeates street and social life, Arabs are also organizing to influence local politics, starting with the schools, where they make up nearly two-thirds of the ballooning enrollment. At Stout Middle School, like other schools here, Muslim girls in head scarves jump rope in sex-segregated gym classes." Wilgoren seems to posit "their culture" against an implicit culture in the rest of us. By highlighting "girls in head scarves" in "sex-segregated gym classes," Wilgoren contributes to the construction of difference delineated through clothing. And while sex segregation is typical in U.S. gym classes, Wilgoren's linking of sex-segregated gym classes with "Muslim

girls in head scarves" appears to make the sex segregation an aberration of Islam that colors Dearborn schools.

Conflicts around schools are frequently linked to residential segregation. "Arab Americans long ago spilled over from the South End, near Ford's Rouge Plant, to dominate Dearborn's East End, and are increasingly buying houses—whose values keep rising despite warnings of immigrants ruining the neighborhood—in the West End and even in nearby Dearborn Heights." Using the phrase "spilling over," Wilgoren evokes the imagery of a toxic spill. The specter of failure of containment of an "alien" population is rearticulated as contamination and domination. Reifying cultural and religious difference, Wilgoren blames Arab Americans for failure to assimilate into the nation: "Considering the community's longevity and upward mobility, many question why it has not moved further into the mainstream. New waves of immigrants reinforce old-world ways. Religious differences and disagreements of America's place in the world exacerbate feelings of isolation." Wilgoren's article's discursive deployments of culture, religion, sex, and nationality not only spatially map race onto Arab Americans' bodies, but also reinscribe the precariousness of Arab American citizenship by suggesting its shaky grounding upon "divided loyalties."

MUSLIMS AS DISTINCTIVELY DEVOUT

When the *NYT* is reporting on Muslim Americans engaged in activities that are shared by non-Muslim Americans, the distinctive religious devoutness of Muslims is a centrally figured representation. Religiosity is marked as that which makes Muslim Americans different, that which makes their quotidian activities not so normal or everyday. Muslim Youth Day at Six Flags Great Adventure is the topic of "Stalled Since 9/11, a Gathering Resumes with High Security," by Jill P. Capuzzo, which appeared on September 18, 2004. The article focuses on the prayer practices, religious dress, food, and religious beliefs of the Muslim attendees. Islamic religious practice is particularly emphasized in this article and made to seem like a priority before American roller coaster fun, and possibly even inhibitory to normal theme park experience.

It may have been Aqsa Khan's first visit to Six Flags Great Adventure, but she knew enough to hustle over to the park's largest roller coast as soon as the midday prayer ended. . . .

After waiting two hours to get in, Yasser Abraham and his family headed straight to the picnic area, where halal dishes like samosas, biryani and buttered chicken replaced the usual burgers and fries.

Before racing off to their favorite rides, most gathered for the midday prayer. Giant blue plastic tarps were spread across the pavement in front of Fort Independence, where men knelt facing east during the hourlong sermon. Behind them, women lined more blue tarps on the ground beside Bluebeard's Lost Treasure Train. Three other less formal prayer sessions were scheduled throughout the day.

Although Six Flags and other amusement parks cater to group events on a regular basis, the *New York Times* does not usually make such events objects of news. Overall, the article's narrative can give the reader the impression that Six Flags' usual amusement routine was disrupted by Muslim difference and religiosity. The theme park's temporal order was thrown out of joint—Halloween decorations had to be put up late. "Six Flags would usually have had its Halloween decoration up by now, but the park honored the sponsor's request to hold off hanging skeletons, witches and ghosts, which Mr. Farrukh said were viewed as idols by some Muslims." Prayer times took priority over the rush to rides. That halal food is noted to have replaced the usual menu of burgers and fries reminds good citizens that "American" food is being displaced by foreign food. We were made quite aware of the political significance of food in national symbolism in the call by many "patriots" to change french fries to freedom fries (France had not backed the U.S. war on terror to the satisfaction of many U.S. nationalists).

The article singles out differential dress as a cause of bias against Muslims.

Most of those who came to Friday's event—while highly sensitive to the bias against Muslims, often brought on by their style of dress—were unaware of this week's controversy. . . . While most of the women at the event complied with some version of the dress code, or hijab, fully covering their bodies and heads, standards were somewhat loosened for the men, many of whom were admitted in shorts and T-shirts.

In declaring that "bias against Muslims" is "often brought on by their style of dress," Capuzzo implies that it is Muslim dress, not racism, that causes violence against Muslims. This racializing discourse, which projects intolerable difference onto Muslims, is gendered insofar as Capuzzo scrutinizes women's

so-called "dress code" and invests the hijab as the cause of curiosity, conflict, and bias.

Clothing is but one of many cultural cues that signal difference in this piece. The article also discusses "threats and racial epithets" leveled at the event and its participants. Although such sentiment is described as discriminatory by a Six Flags spokesperson, Six Flags still runs extra FBI checks on the sponsoring group.

Ms. Siebeneicher [Six Flags spokeswoman] said that the most disturbing thing about the questions she fielded about the event was the implication that Six Flags was playing host to a terrorist-friendly organization.

She said one talk show host asked if the company would rent the park to Nazis. The park's guest services phone lines and the company's corporate offices in Oklahoma were flooded by callers asking Six Flags to reverse its decision and threatening to boycott or sue the park.

"It's truly sad and very unfortunate that people feel that way," she said. "This is America. Six Flags doesn't discriminate against race, religion or sexual orientation. We're not about politics."

Nevertheless, Six Flags did run an additional F.B.I. check on the sponsoring group, despite the fact that they had rented the park to the group twice before.

This passage occasions a comparison between Nazis and Muslims. There is a general denunciation of discrimination, but Six Flags still invites FBI investigation of Muslims. Thus, Muslims are made to seem worthy of suspicion. A distinction is made between prejudicial statements and police scrutiny, where the former is considered discriminatory and not the latter. Capuzzo, Six Flags, and the FBI seem to share the view that the threat of terrorism looms behind Muslim religiosity.

Representations of Islam as the primary factor determining the life practices and identities of Muslims enact a process of othering. "Stitch by Stitch, a Daughter of Islam Takes on Taboos," an article by Hilarie M. Sheets, printed November 25, 2001, is about an artist, Ghada Amer, whose primary subject matter is not limited to Islam. From the article, we can gather that Amer's work treats an array of subject matter across cultures, including but not limited to Islamic cultures. Yet the article's title categorizes the artist, Ghada Amer, as "a Daughter of Islam," as if Islam were itself a distinct kinship structure, one united and all-defining family.

"What is going on now politically is like a mirror of what has always gone on in myself, because I am a hybrid of the West and the East," says Ghada Amer, a 38-year-old Egyptian-born artist who lived in France from the age of 11 and moved to Manhattan four years ago. "It's a clash between civilizations that of course don't understand each other. I've lived with these contradictions all my life."

It's no surprise, then, that Ms. Amer talks about making art as both therapeutic and biographical. Her subject is women, always, and in both her paintings and her sculptures, in which embroidery is her main tool, she beautifully and subtly investigates the place of women in the history of all cultures.

"I don't want viewers to see my work as the work of 'the other,'" she says. "That's the most insulting thing that could happen."

Sheets's title contradicts Amer's moment of self-definition. Amer describes herself as "a hybrid," but Sheets describes her as "a daughter of Islam." While Amer does not want her work to be seen as Other, Sheets's title sums up Amer's identity through Islam. The treatment of Islam as the driving identity for any Muslim reduces not only the historical, cultural, and theological diversity of Islam, but also the complexity of all Muslims. Colonialist strategy, Trinh Minh-ha has noted, homogenizes the "Other" as a way of creating an oppositional binary, which defines the other as enemy (1989). When news representations contain the identities of Muslims by making Islam the key thing to understanding all there is to know about Muslims individually or as a group, Muslims are made to seem distinct and homogenous, unique and different by means of religious identification. Although Sheets's article does not mark Amer as an "enemy," it constructs an "Otherness" to which discourses about enemies may attach.

Discourses of Arab Muslim Otherness parallel representations of racialized groups of Muslims that are not Arab. The December 17, 2001, article "A New Minority Makes Itself Known: Hispanic Muslims," by Evelyn Nieves, attempts to explain why Latinos might convert to or be attracted to Islam. Devoutness comes to the fore as a determining factor in some Latinos' conversion to Islam.

Religion scholars say that Islam also attracts those who prefer a more rigorous way to worship than what they find here in the Roman Catholic Church.

"There are those in the Roman Catholic tradition who are somewhat discontent with the modernizing trends of the Catholic Church," said Wade Clark Roof, chairman of the religious studies department at the University of California at Santa Barbara. "To those people," Mr. Roof said, "a religious

tradition such as Islam, that attempts to maintain a fairly strict set of patterns and practices, becomes attractive."

Conversion is explained through marking Islam as holding off the modernizing processes. Islamic practices are said to be more "rigorous," "strict," or devout, than the supposedly more modern Catholic Church. Converts are represented as those who are already particularly prone to devout religiosity:

"I loved religion," said Ms. Ballivian, who converted to Islam eight years ago in Virginia and now practices in Los Angeles. "I was very religious in Catholic high school. I told myself that I would study philosophy and religion. I remember getting in trouble in Catholic school for debating things like the concept of original sin at a really young age. When I actually studied Islam, it made it all simple."

Nieves's representation of Islam and its converts not only portrays Islam as a less modern and more religious religion than Catholicism, but portrays Latinos as more devoutly Catholic than non-Latino, white Catholics, a common move in the racialization of Latinos. In turn, the figure of the religious Latino who converts to Islam to act out devoutness reinscribes representations of the racialized extreme religiosity of Muslims.

Muslim Americans are frequently represented as uniformly devout, and Muslims' everyday activities are represented with relation to prayer. Daniel Wakin's May 28, 2004 article, "Even Muslims on the Move Stop at Prayer Time," details Muslim taxi drivers' prayer practices and represents prayer as imperative to all Muslims. The title uses the word "even," implying that it is beyond what one would expect, or out of the ordinary, that people on the move would stop to pray, and also suggesting that every Muslim, no matter what that person is doing, stops to pray at particular times. Muslims are portrayed as having no choice, feeling compelled to pray:

You drive a cab, wafted across the city on the whims of your fares. But you are Muslim, and must pray five times a day—which involves ablutions, facing east and a series of prostrations in submission to God.

What to do? . . .

The drivers congregate in South Asian restaurants that provide prayer space in basements or back rooms. They have an imprint of the city's mosques

in their brains, at the ready wherever a fare may take them as prayer time closes in. Using a small carpet kept in the trunk, they pray in the back seat, or even on the side of the road.

The article depicts Muslims' brains as hardwired for religiosity: mosque sites organize their psyches. In this representation, the compulsion to pray manifests in Muslims very bodily schema. In Wakin's article, the racialization of religion produces a racial body. This is an example of "how the return of the biological theme is permitted and with it the elaboration of new variants of the biological 'myth' within the framework of cultural racism" (Balibar 1991, 26). Wakin's article moves into a more explicit staging of worship focused on the Muslim body.

A large cheap rug lay over a bed of ornamental mulch. Then men first washed in a restroom at the arrivals terminal. They then unrolled tiny carpets over the rug, took off their shoes and faced east toward Mecca to pray as planes roared overhead and traffic whooshed by. A tuft of pine trees hid them from the road. In front of their bending bodies was a chain link fence and then a sea of yellow cabs waiting their turn to approach the taxi stand. The cabbies prayed quickly so they could reach their taxis before it was their time to move ahead in line.

The cabbie prayer strategies are a prime example of how outsiders trace new religious pathways in a city burbling with the world's faiths, sociologists of religion say.

Marked as "outsiders," here Muslims appear to bring prayer practices into the space of the city, paving religious pathways that become the outside within the city. The ultimate contradiction and outside to the capitalist city is represented by a decision for religion over money: "Sometimes it boils down to a choice between prayers or fares. Mr. Abdemula said if he is near a mosque where parking is difficult, he will put on his off-duty sign and forsake business well before the hour of midday prayer."

Some NYT representations make Islamic religious devotion seem so determining, so much the overriding force in identity formation, that it turns against its own practitioners, causing internalized conflicts and self-contempt. "Gay Muslims Face a Growing Challenge Reconciling Their Two Identities," written by Robert Worth, published January 13, 2002, represents Islamic religiosity as homophobic, and suggests that gay Muslims have split identities.

Although reconciling their sexual and spiritual life has always been difficult, several gay Muslims said the Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath have driven them more deeply than ever into a double life. . . .

Some are resigned to the belief that their impulses are evil, and regard the holy month of Ramadan as an opportunity to redeem themselves, several gay Muslims said.

While many NYT representations of Muslim Americans repeat the theme of split identity, it is usually a split between Muslim and American identity. Here, the split is represented as gay identity versus Muslim identity, while all the responsibility for homophobia and the psychic trauma it produces is projected onto Islam. Gay Muslim identity is made abject, constructed as that which is unliveable, evil even for gay Muslims themselves.

At the same time, Worth implies that non-Muslim religions and countries are relatively accepting of gay identities. Against Christian or Jewish gay identities, gay Muslim American identity in particular is made to seem problematic:

Yet to be both Muslim and gay may be particularly challenging, because unlike Christianity and Judaism, Islam is still inseparable from culture and politics in many countries where it is practiced. . . .

That perceived threat is reflected in harsh penalties in many Arab and Islamic countries. Under the Taliban, people found to have engaged in homosexual behavior had a brick wall collapsed onto them. This was done several times in the last several years, according to international news reports and Taliban radio and newspaper sources. Other countries are similarly severe.

By denying that Christianity and Judaism infuse, and are imbued with, culture and politics, Worth's piece portrays the United States as a fairly free and safe haven from homophobic violence, in contrast to predominantly Muslim countries, which are portrayed as far more oppressive. Interestingly, Worth's article clearly describes instances in which U.S. Islamophobic discourse intersects with homophobic discourse:

Yet if the United States represents freedom and safety to gay Muslims, many of them also say they have been shocked and upset, since Sept. 11, by their fellow Americans' ignorance and disrespect toward Islam, even among other gays. . . .

Several said they had been offended by articles in the gay and mainstream press suggesting that Mohamed Atta and other hijackers may have been motivated by repressed homosexual rage.

In much U.S. press, then, Islam is blamed for causing homophobia, even while Islamophobic news articles ascribe violent (repressed) homosexuality to Muslims. Projecting a dysfunctional sexuality onto Mohamed Atta calls to mind Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai's argument that representations of terrorists construct them as racially and sexually monstrous and perverse. This coincidence between racist, Islamophobic, and homophobic discourses is missed when Worth glosses these as "disrespect toward Islam." Indeed, in the instances that the article describes, homophobia is central to assaults on Islam. Worth's fantasy of a less homophobic United States is further contradicted by the depiction, in this same article, of homophobic violence in U.S. civil society and the state.

Muslim clerics are far from the only people who are hostile toward homosexuality. In October, an Associated Press photograph that appeared in newspapers showed a Navy crewman on an aircraft carrier standing next to a bomb on which the words "Hijack this" and a crude antigay slur had been scrawled.

In their essay "Monster, Terrorist, Fag," Puar and Rai contextualize the "Hijack this" incident within a larger problematic, in which nationalism and the war on terrorism are constituted and executed through racialized and sexualized discourses. By linking gays to terrorism, the bomb's inscription ascribes a sexual identity to its targets. Because U.S. bombs in the war on terror have been aimed overwhelmingly at Muslims, the bomb nominates Muslims as queers. Enacting a racialized heteronormative violence that proposes to eradicate a terrorist imagined as queer and Muslim, the Navy's homophobia articulates the fantasies of imperial aggression in the war on terror.

If Worth's article can carry a narrative suggesting a more tolerant United States, more amenable than Muslim countries are toward gays, it is only by gingerly passing over the centrality of homophobia in a U.S. nationalism that violently excludes and attacks Muslims. Worth is able simultaneously to represent the United States as tolerant of gay citizens and as violently homophobic toward Muslims, precisely because Muslims do not count as full citizens or members of the nation-state who deserve respect. The U.S. government has used the discourse

of tolerance as a justification for waging war against Muslim countries. Calling itself tolerant and predominantly Muslim countries intolerant, the United States claims to usher in freedom from gender and sexual oppression, while it enacts massive military aggression that is both racist and homophobic. In sum, Worth's piece articulates a problematic in which Islam is blamed for the disavowed homophobia of U.S. nationalism, while gay Muslims are invested as the epitome of the pathology of Muslim religious devotion.

DEVOTION TO ISLAM AS AN OBSTACLE
TO PARTICIPATION IN THE NATION

Muslim Americans are often portrayed as more devoted to Islam than to the United States. Representational devices that collapse diversity into homogeneity may serve to present all Arab Americans and Muslim Americans as conforming to one congregate anti-American ideological positioning. From March 8, 2002, "Muslims Return from Mecca with Joy, yet Concern," by Chris Hedges, portrays Muslim religious devotion in close affinity with anti-American sentiment. As the backdrop for this story about Muslims, Hedges begins with a scene in an Arab American community:

Despite gray skies and freezing winds, the mood is festive in this heavily Arab-American community.

People have been returning from the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that all Muslims are expected to make at least once in their lives. The pilgrims have come home to white banners offering congratulations in Arabic, strings of lights flashing outside their homes and restaurants booked for homecoming parties.

They have also come home with a sense of uncertainty. While many of those who made the pilgrimage this year left Islam's holiest sites feeling renewed in their faith, many also left disturbed by the growing gap between the Muslim world and the American world.

The distance between the two cultures was felt keenly, pilgrims said, when Muslims from other countries chanted "Death to Israel" and "Death to America" during a ritual stoning of the devil that is part of the pilgrimage.

In this representation, loyalty to Islam conflicts with loyalty to the United States. The article locates the Arab American community as the site of people who have

intimate contact with "anti-American" feeling. Although the article's opening scene is apparently festive, it quickly turns to negativity, as Hedges posits a "gap" between "Muslim" and "American" worlds, as if the two must be oppositional and anyone living both must be in a position of "uncertainty."

The article by Hedges portrays a massive crowd at Mecca, and calls it "a mirage," or "a vast wave." Muslim Americans are represented as "caught up," overtaken, suggesting that Muslim group identity envelops individual Arab and Muslim American identities. Muslim religious devoutness is represented as close to religious fanaticism, and fanaticism is represented as the character of a race of people who are trained primarily for collective identity rather than for individuality. Tensions from the conglomeration of Muslims at Mecca—labeled a "pressure cooker" of "anti-American sentiment"—are transferred to the moment of return from Mecca to the predominantly Arab American community. Implied conflicts of interest manifest as confusion, or vacillation across a fissure that supposedly increasingly separates "the Muslim world and the American world," as Muslim Americans are represented as "disturbed," and "hoping to reconcile . . . Islam . . . with the religion espoused by militants." The article poses Muslim Americans as "troubled by the alienation . . . from other Americans." Alienation appears to emanate from Mecca, moving through the circuit of Islam, and landing in Arab America, where anti-American sentiment is transported as uncertainty and is consolidated as withdrawal from identification with the nation.

Numerous *NYT* articles depict Muslim Americans as identifying more closely with other Muslims and Islam than with other Americans. John Leland's article from May 5, 2004, "Tension in a Michigan City over Muslims' Call to Prayer," portrays an Islamic center in Hamtramck, Michigan, as a public disruption: "To hear people in this blue-collar city tell it, things were fine until the al-Islah Islamic Center petitioned to broadcast its call to prayer, or azan, over an outdoor loudspeaker." While giving little space to quotes from supporters of the Islamic center, Leland quotes its critics at length.

Jackie Rutherford, a librarian and youth-care worker, sat on her front stoop watching three men in Islamic shirt-dresses and tupi caps at the house across the street. "I don't know what's going to happen to our little town," said Ms. Rutherford, 39.

"I used to say I wasn't prejudiced against anyone, but then I realized I had a problem with them putting Allah above everyone else," she said, of the plan

to amplify the call to prayer, which mosques announce five times a day. "It's throwing salt in a wound. I feel they've come to our country, infiltrated it, and they sit there looking at us, laughing, calling us fools."

The language of wounding implies harm to the physical well-being of an otherwise healthy, or "fine" body politic. Muslim Americans are portrayed as foreign invaders who are loyal to Islam to the point of total disregard for other Americans, who are portrayed as displaced and imposed upon. Leland points out, "Three mosques have opened in the last few years, increasing in size while the congregations at neighboring Roman Catholic churches dwindle," and quotes a born-again Christian, Joanne Golen, as saying, "I don't want to be told that Allah is the true and only God five times a day, 365 days a year. It's against my constitutional rights to have to listen to another religion evangelize in my ear." Leland's article creates a spectacle of Muslim religiosity and generously quotes non-Muslims who act as if they are being marginalized by Muslims: "Everyone talks about their rights," Mr. Schultz said. "The rights of Christians have been stripped from them. Last week there were Muslims praying downstairs, in a public building. If Christians tried to do that, the A.C.L.U. would shut us down."

Not only does Leland's piece portray Muslims as trampling on public space and private rights, Leland suggests that Muslims intentionally distance themselves from other Americans:

Like others in his mosque, Mr. Musad said, he was drawn to the Muslim community here not for its engagement with the rest of America, but for its distance.

"What attracted me was seeing school girls with veils and burkas," he said.

"It's more authentic here than in New York, more roots. There's village life."

Leland construes one mosque participant's preference for seeing veils and burkas as un-American. Veils and burkas are signified as central organizers of social life and markers of separateness from Americans society. Leland points up difference by projecting it onto the clothing of Muslim American women and men. While the dress of non-Muslims does not receive comment, Leland offers a description of "men in Islamic shirt-dresses and tupi caps."

Because Muslims are positioned at odds with other Americans, relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims are marked as disruptive aberrations. When irreducible difference is projected onto Muslim Americans, they are

marked as deviant, and relationships with them become deviant. Judith Matloff's October 28, 2001, piece is entitled "When a Spouse Is Muslim, New Bonds, New Rifts." By attaching the descriptor "Muslim" to one spouse and leaving the other unmarked, social relations of "bonds" and "rifts" appear to be determined by Muslimness. The partner who is not Muslim needs no marking; they are the presumed norm. "These are trying times for couples in which one partner is Muslim." It appears that a radical reorganization of social relations occurs around a Muslim partner: "Sometimes there is a staunch closing of ranks, as is the case with Ms. Plapinger and Mr. Ahmed. Sometimes couples are torn apart." Marriage, the space of the domestic, is inscribed by the national, even as it reproduces the limits of national membership. Because Muslim Americans are marked as more tied to Islam than to the United States, a non-Muslim spouse of a Muslim is forced into a choice between devotion to a Muslim spouse or devotion to the United States. The thrust of the article is that the pull of Islam is so great it can tear apart couples. Inasmuch as the heterosexual couple figures centrally as a building block of the nation and a source of national reproductivity, anxiety arises over the threat interreligious dating with Muslims poses to the harmony of the nation's family.

Devotion to Islam is represented as posing a problem for participation in the U.S. national order. William Glaberson's October 21, 2001, article, "Interpreting Islamic Law for American Muslims," contrasts Islamic law with U.S. jurisprudence. Treating Islam as atavistic and incongruous with modernity, he implies that Muslim Americans are incompatible with the U.S. polity. Glaberson states: "For millions of American Muslims, the centuries-old body of Islamic law explains how they should live their lives in this country." The article implies that it is difficult for Muslim Americans to live under U.S. jurisprudence, insofar as it differs from Islamic law: "One complication for many Muslims has been that, unlike the courts of some Muslim counties, American courts have refused to defer to Islamic law in some important areas. American courts, for example, have consistently declined to accept a divorce procedure acceptable under Islamic law, which permits a husband to divorce his wife simply by announcing the divorce three times." By highlighting divorce as an example, difference is produced through the frame of gender relations. Difference is not a relation of equivalence here: Islam is marked as in need of change. That Christianity and Judaism are both older than Islam does not faze Glaberson, who asserts that for Muslim Americans the issue is "the challenge of interpreting an ancient religion

for a modern society." Marking Muslims as incompatible with law opens up the space for legal exceptionalism, the subtext of which can justify the use of extralegal measures by the state to deal with people it constitutes as outside the frame of law. As law professors Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson have observed, "the current treatment of Arabs and Muslims is more extralegal than the internment" of Japanese during World War II.

No Executive Order authorizes the treatment of Arabs and Muslims; nor has there been a formal declaration of war. Moreover, nationality which is more objective and easier to apply than religious and racial classifications, is not used as the exclusive basis for the measures. Rather, the scope of the investigation is broad and amorphous enough to potentially include all Arabs and Muslims, who may be natives of countries from around the world. (2002, 337)

As Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are subsumed under the racialized logic of exceptionalism, they are increasingly marginalized from citizenship. Giorgio Agamben argues that exception has been paradigmatic of sovereignty in political modernity. It is by the enactment of modes of rule not constrained by prescriptions of law that law gains its force. Exception arises from law and applies to law inasmuch as law is suspended in the state of exception. Law's power to exceed itself is precisely what consolidates its normative force. Agamben argues that "bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power" (1998, 6). The distinction between bare life and political life is, according to Agamben, central to the founding of sovereignty. Bare life is that which is excluded from political life; yet the political takes bare life as its object upon which to act. This contradiction is revealed in modern democracies by their constitutional valorizations of rights to life, which accompany the utter failure to secure the well-being of bare life, most evidenced by the always-looming presence or threat of the concentration camp. Because the camp has been reintroduced for the internment of Muslims and Arabs, it is crucial that we consider how discourses of difference—such as the implication of Muslim incompatibility with U.S. law—can set the grounds for mobilizing technologies of governance capable of stripping Arab Americans and Muslim Americans of their status as subjects of the body politic. U.S. nationalism unleashes its sovereign power through ongoing renewals of the idea or the practice of the camp. This mode of state violence will continue, so long as the state recognizes some people as citizens worthy of rights,

while relegating others to abject positions, such as noncitizen, alien, enemy, fanatic, or terrorist.

LINKING ARAB AMERICANS AND MUSLIM AMERICANS
TO INTERNATIONAL MUSLIMS AND MUSLIM MOVEMENTS

Dated April 6, 2002, Susan Saulny's piece "Demonstrations Highlight Deep Divisions over Growing Conflict in Middle East," evidences the tendency to explain Arab American and Muslim American politics in terms of religiosity, drawing a link between Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and international Muslims and Muslim movements. Discussing demonstrations in Brooklyn in support of Israel as well as demonstrations in support of Palestine, the article overwhelmingly covers the arguments of supporters of Israel, while it ties Arab American support for Palestine to religious devotion.

Outside the Palestinian Mission, meanwhile, Mr. Pataki, Mr. McCall and other elected officials condemned the Palestinian political leadership and supported what they called Israel's right to defend itself against suicide bombers. Buffeted by a wave of suicide attacks, Israel embarked on a military assault a week ago that it said was aimed at dismantling a terrorist infrastructure controlled by Mr. Arafat.

The City Council speaker, Gifford Miller, said New Yorkers should have a special understanding of the reaction to the bombings, given what happened on Sept. 11. "This is our fight as well," he said. "This is our battle for freedom from terrorism." . . .

[State Controller, H. Carl] McCall, who visited Israel four weeks ago, said: "As Americans, our hearts go out to the terror victims and their families. And as Americans, we need to keep sending the message to Washington—the president must remain steadfast in his support for Israel."

Another speaker, Jose Luis Pacanowski, who teaches social studies at a high school in Midwood, Brooklyn, denounced the cost of round-the-clock police protection at the Palestinian Mission. "As a Jew living in New York City, I feel the P.L.O. have no right to be here, in New York City, being subsidized by the government," he said. "Yasir Arafat has made this very personal, and I feel threatened."

He added, "Would we want an organization representing Osama bin Laden having a headquarters here and being protected by our police department?"

Although Saulny is mostly quoting these views, they are disproportionately given voice in Saulny's piece, in comparison to the mere two relatively brief quotes from individual Palestinian supporters. While accusing the PLO of terrorism and comparing Yasser Arafat to Osama bin Laden, these quotes portray Americans and Israelis as comparably victims of terror. Because the Palestinian mission is regarded as nothing more than the representative of the PLO, it is supposedly not deserving of police protection, and perhaps should not even exist, because the PLO should not be here, or so the argument goes. If the PLO has no right to be in the United States, and the Palestinian mission is seen as merely an extension of the PLO, the implication is that any body representing Palestinians should not be allowed either. If one follows this logic, Arab American protesters, by association, may not be welcome either, for their rallying represents Palestinian interests. Further, if the fight for Israel is considered a fight for American freedom from terrorism, then Arab Americans who support Palestinians—equated here with the PLO and Yasser Arafat, who is himself compared to Osama bin Laden—suddenly seem like supporters of terrorism. Thus they are not really Americans because Americans are those who can empathize with Israel as having been victimized by terrorism. In sum, this article contains a subtle discursive thread that ties together Palestinians, Arab Americans, and Osama bin Laden. Once bin Laden is invoked—in any of these twenty-eight *New York Times* articles or in other U.S. news articles—a whole signifying chain of association is raised that calls to mind so-called Islamic fanaticism and draws links between Muslims everywhere, portraying them as a looming, threatening network.

The specter of Muslim religiosity is precisely the imagery this article deploys in its depiction of a scene of Arab American supporters of Palestinians, thus buttressing the possibility for linking Arab Americans to the much fantasized "Islamic terrorism" (even if Saulny does not explicitly say that there is in fact such a link): "In Patterson, a city with a large Arab-American population, about 200 supporters of the Palestinians gathered in a parking lot opposite the Robert A. Roe Federal Building. The hourlong rally followed a Muslim prayer service in which about 50 men and boys knelt on rugs laid over the pavement with the bronze dome of the Passaic County Courthouse looming overhead." Because Muslim religiosity is centralized in the representation of Arab American protestors, there is a glossing of religious difference amongst Arab Americans. Furthermore the specifically Muslim religious devoutness of Arab Americans is

demonstrated through its manifestation in politics. From such a portrayal, the message is sent that it is devotion to Islam that seals Arab Americans to Palestinians, and both groups to Osama bin Laden.

INTERNATIONAL MUSLIMS—DEVOUTNESS AND FANATICISM

A September 29, 2001, article by Peter Steinfels expresses a skepticism as to whether there are Muslims whose politics seriously diverge from those of Osama bin Laden. In the article, "Amid Islam's Complexity, Scholars Are Challenged to Influence Change Without Compromising," Steinfels questions whether Muslim American organizations are communicating calls for peace and condemnations of terrorism to Muslim audiences.

Authentic Islam, the world has been told repeatedly in recent days, condemns terrorism, rejects violence against innocent civilians and advocates peace. The message has come from many of the highest Muslim religious authorities, from American Muslim organizations, from the pope, from the president and from many others. . . .

But without in any way questioning the value or sincerity of such statements, many people want to know whether these condemnations, voiced to non-Muslim audiences at a moment of crisis, are consistently and systematically communicated to primarily Muslim populations.

Muslims may not necessarily be a constitutive part of Steinfels operative "world." That is, if "the world" has been instructed, "Islam . . . condemns terrorism," then why the concern over whether this information has been communicated to "Muslim populations," unless the latter fall out of the world in question? Refusal to recognize that Muslims occupy the same time and space as non-Muslims enables Steinfels's line of inquiry. Alternatively, his query could be read as allowing for one world that is split into "primarily Muslim populations" and "non-Muslim audiences" but still encompasses both groups. The question, then, becomes: when Muslim leaders are talking to "primarily Muslim populations," do they perhaps talk to part of the world or to people outside the world? Either of these two spatial renderings could serve as the basis upon which Steinfels constructs an argument about the inconsistency of Muslim leadership. The possibility for failure to "consistently and systematically" relay "the message" is dependent upon Muslim movement in another space, outside or fractured inside the normative

world to which Muslim communication is unknowable. The implication is that Muslims do not fully participate in the quotidian space of the body politic, and Steinfels demands that Muslims disclose their other activities.

If there is some ambiguity about whom Steinfels counts as members of a world community, his invocation of "modern civilization" begs questions of group membership and implies the backwardness of Muslims, installing Muslims outside the world community of modern civilization. "Are there significant networks of Muslim scholars and intellectuals striving to articulate a genuinely Islamic vision that would embrace individual freedom, political democracy, pluralism, equal rights for minorities and women and other values that have emerged as the better part of modern civilization?" Steinfels interrogates the very compatibility of "a genuinely Islamic vision" with "modern civilization," implying that Muslims are either not in modern civilization or at least do not compose its "better part." Steinfels marks the "West" as the exemplary manifestation of "modern civilization." For Steinfels, "if Osama bin Laden's network is only a tiny group at the end of a spectrum, at many other points on that spectrum there are Muslims closer to his worldview than to the West's." Ideological adherence to the set of values, "individual freedom, political democracy, pluralism, equal rights for minorities and women," or "the better part of modern civilization" is what qualifies one for membership in Steinfels's "West." Moreover, Steinfels imagines that these are the actual attributes proper to the "West," its specific possessions. Against these, Steinfels posits "the official class of religious teachers in many parts of the Muslim world," who are "intellectually calcified"—one might say caught in static, timeless, backward thought—and promote "anti-Western, antiliberal" theories. Liberal and West are articulated as equivalents that oppose bin Laden, the West's opposite. Though Steinfels says that there is a spectrum between bin Laden and the West, the construction is evidently quite Manichaeic:

Meanwhile, are there counterparts to those extremist ideologues? Are there Muslim thinkers and scholars immersed in their faith, sensitive to the frustrations and resentments of the Muslim world, and yet appreciative of Western liberties not as an affront but as a stimulus to re-examine the riches of Islam and determine what can and cannot be affirmed with full religious integrity?

In asking if there are Muslim "counterparts to those extremist ideologues," Steinfels exposes his suspicion about the very possibility of liberal Muslims. The

ideologies Steinfels prescribes for Muslims enact closures around the discursive parameters of "world." When discussing the ideological space Muslims supposedly occupy, using the phrase "Muslim world," a religious identity, "Muslim," precedes and modifies "world." In another deployment, "world" remains unmarked, suggesting a presumed self with whom Steinfels identifies, in contradistinction to a differently remarked upon (Muslim) Other. Where "Muslim" does not explicitly precede "world," "world" is articulated as compatible with modern civilization, West, and liberalism. The notion of "the Muslim world" differentiates "Muslims" from all the rest. The (normative, unmarked) "world" witnesses one performance by Muslim leaders, while Muslim populations, framed in "the Muslim world," partake in the ideological space of bin Laden.

Reference to "the Muslim World" assumes a homogenized conglomerate group that listens with one set of ears and speaks with one voice; it does not partake in "individual freedom." This homogenizing is an example of what Etienne Balibar calls "differentialist" or "culturalist" racism, whereby racialization is achieved through reference to "a deep psychology," "since it carries with it an image of Islam as a 'conception of the world' which is incompatible with Europeaness and an enterprise of universal ideological domination." Balibar notes that this discourse often organizes "contemporary Arabophobia, especially in France," where it entails "a systematic confusion of 'Arabness' and 'Islamicism'" (1991, 24). Although Steinfels does not mention Arabs or Arab Americans in his article, Balibar's observations about Arabophobia can be extended to the U.S. context as well, as examples we provide in other sections make clear.

Steinfels charges Muslim American organizations with the responsibility to "influence change without compromising." In a paternalistic tone, Steinfels advises how to support "Western liberties":

What can be done to encourage a network of Muslim thinkers—without compromising them? American Muslim organizations might play an important role, as might private foundations and academic centers.

An enterprise like this, although it cannot be directly part of a struggle against terrorism, is surely not irrelevant to the outcome.

Listed in juxtaposition, "American Muslim organizations" and "private foundations and academic centers" appear separate. The latter groupings, presumably non-Muslim, must "encourage" Muslim intellectual activity. As Muslim

American organizations are guided by non-Muslims, full agency in the struggle against terrorism still lies elsewhere from Muslims' partial effort. In sum, colonialist discourse echoes throughout Steinfeld's narrative: Muslims occupy a place not fully part of the civilized time-space of the world, and non-Muslims must discipline Muslim leaders into more consistent accountability toward Western liberal ideology.

Steinfeld implies that "equal rights for minorities and women" are grounded in Western values but are without assurance in Muslim ideology. The colonialist civilizing imperative that accompanies such a suggestion has been aptly summed up by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as: "white men, seeking to save brown women from brown men" (1999, 303). In this case, non-Muslim white men are posited as saviors, not only of women generally, but of "minorities," as both are held to suffer under backward Muslim ideology. The United States, then, is constructed as a site of equality for minorities—sexual, religious, racial, and so forth—thus disavowing the processes of exclusion so integral to the U.S. national formation, contemporarily and historically.

NYT authors often liken all Muslims to terrorists, to the point of practically disallowing for any discussion of Islam or Muslims that does not address terrorism to some degree. "A Portrait of the Prophet Behind Islam," Alessandra Stanley's December 18, 2002, piece, criticizes the documentary film *Muhammad: Legacy of a Prophet*. Stanley labels the film "hypersensitive" because it offers "heartwarming depictions" of Muslim communities, rather than discussing Muslims with relation to terrorism. Stanley suggests that the film's angle is due to Muslim sponsorship.

Perhaps understandably, given the climate after Sept. 11, the film also seeks over and over to reassure viewers who fear a link between the Koran and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Steering viewers away from considering terrorism, the filmmakers illustrate Muhammad's teachings by focusing on a cozy, comforting portrait of Muslim communities in America. Heartwarming depictions of a Muslim New York City firefighter, a hijab-wearing nurse in Dearborn, Mich., and a black Muslim Capitol Hill staff member in Washington, packaged around glowing testimonials by clerics and academics, turn the Muhammad story into a lengthy infomercial for Islam.

That is partly because most of the sponsors (they include Arabian Bulk Trade, Sabadia Family Foundation, Irfan Kathwari Foundation, El-Hibri Foundation,

and Qureishi Family Trust) are Muslim-American business and community organizations eager to have the story told in the most favorable light possible.

Stanley insinuates that Muslim funding creates a distorted representation of Islam. Within Stanley's reasoning, one must conclude that any positive media depiction of Islam is hiding something behind its portrayal, that something has been "packaged" for marketing purposes. Stanley is saying that information cannot be trusted from a film that presents a "cozy, comforting portrait of Muslim communities in America." For Stanley, any discussion of Islam that does not represent Islam as linked to terrorism must be a distorted infomercial, not a serious, objective documentary.

Some of the academics recruited to help narrate the story are so eager to banish stereotypes about Islam that they sound like missionaries, not historians. Karen Armstrong, a former nun who wrote a biography of Muhammad, is perhaps the most colorful partisan, dismissing critiques of Muslim practices like polygamy or the veil in a plummy, authoritative British accent that makes her sound like Margaret Thatcher defending free enterprise.

By comparing academics to missionaries, Stanley attributes sympathetic observations about Islam to religiosity. Denouncing academics for their supposed failure to criticize Muslim practices, while not elaborating, historicizing, or contextualizing debates around Muslim practices, Stanley's own rendering gives a selective, biased, slanted history. Stanley's quick criticism reconsolidates the dominant terms on which Muslim cultural and religious practices are discussed as always already wrong and problematic. In Islamophobic discourse, Islam is construed as needing condemnation from the privileged viewpoint of those outside Islam. Finding little merit in the film, Stanley criticizes its depictions of historical and contemporary Islam.

To their credit, the filmmakers did not airbrush one of the more infamous incidents in Muhammad's path to power: the execution of the men of Bani Quraizah, a Jewish tribe in Medina, the community that Muhammad ruled after he fled persecution in Mecca. A narrator cautiously states that according to Muslim sources, the Jewish tribesmen sided with Muhammad's enemies at the siege of Medina.

The filmmakers can only be credited with not “airbrush[ing] one of the more infamous incidents,” however, simultaneously implying that there are other “infamous incidents” neglected by this film. Stating that the narration proceeds “cautiously,” Stanley suggests that history is not being presented forthrightly. “For all its tiptoeing through history, however, the documentary is well worth watching both as the first serious attempt to tell the story of Muhammed [*sic*] on television and also as a testimony to the hypersensitivity of our times.” It seems that for Stanley, only negative events can constitute an authentic historical construction of Islam. The “infamous incidents” Stanley alleges of the past relate to the “terrorism” Stanley emphasizes in the present. In this representation, what Muslims as a group do today is determined by the entire history of the religion. The history Stanley constructs is projected back from the point of the racializing project through which Stanley understands and portrays Islam today.

ARAB AMERICANS AND MUSLIM AMERICANS
AS HIGH-RISK CITIZENS

The title of David Halbfinger's September 24, 2001, article, “A Request for Patience If the Law Overreaches,” is phrased as a plea to accept legal authorities' illegal activities. It is a call for Arab Americans to submit to and tolerate discrimination at the hands of the state because, it is implied, Arab Americans are high-risk citizens. The title, however is unclear regarding whether the request for patience comes from the *NYT* or from the state. Although the issue of racial profiling is explicitly raised, the very coordinators of law enforcement profiling practices are made to seem benevolent.

New Jersey's attorney general today called on the state's many Arab-Americans to help the authorities investigating the terrorist attack on America, but also warned of widespread “ignorance” and urged people to report any abusive treatment by law-enforcement agents.

The attorney general, John J. Farmer Jr., whose greatest challenge before Sept. 11 was rooting out another kind of racial profiling, said that with nearly 200 people being sought by federal investigators in connection with the attacks, “It's inevitable that the net is going to sweep too widely.”

The structure of the police investigation identifies Arab Americans as a group to be policed. The attorney general warns of “ignorance,” to which “abuse” may

be attributed. Yet the very idea of “abuse” assumes a right to rule and domination because it implies that surveillance and other police activities are legitimate and normal, so long as they are not taken to a certain extreme (Mills 1997, 26). The systemic problem of racial profiling is never itself called into question. The violence of the discriminatory practice is projected onto individual attitudes and made to seem aberrant to rather than normative of the regulatory apparatus of the state. In the same instance in which police violence is characterized as perpetrated by some misinformed people—implicitly not including the attorney general, who orders police operations—the systemic character of profiling is dismissed as “inevitable,” as if the state can do nothing but subject Arab Americans to its repressive scrutiny.

Simultaneously posed as protector of Arab Americans and as helplessly in need of Arab American connections, the attorney general is said to have “pleaded for help in the investigation into the attack on America, asking anyone with information—or anyone being sought for questioning—to please come forward, if only through an intermediary.” Arab Americans are asked to accept racial injustice in the name of national justice. But why should Arab Americans be asked—before any other Americans—for information on a “terrorist attack”? The implication is that Arab Americans are privy to information on terrorism by virtue of their ancestry. Are all American Jews of Israeli descent suspect when some American Jews of Israeli descent are caught spying on the American government?

NYT writers often fail to keep a critical distance from the explanatory gestures of the state, making it difficult to distinguish between what the state says and what *NYT* authors say. The effect of this elision facilitates the justification of state surveillance over Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. “Longer Waits for Arabs; Stir over U.S. Eavesdropping,” by Neil A. Lewis and Christopher Marquis, appeared on November 10, 2001, and it extensively cites and quotes the U.S. government's justifications for policies restricting visas and authorizing eavesdropping on “young men from Arab and Muslim nations in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks.” The authors' narrative voice treats government policies as actual prevention measures, rather than as actions the state labels as such. Lewis and Marquis reinforce the legitimacy of government policy insofar as they accept as exhaustively explanatory the government's assertion about what lies behind the policy. “The changes in visa procedures and the new authorized eavesdropping represented what government officials said was a fundamental

shift in antiterror policy to emphasizing prevention." Objectives, means, and ends are represented narrowly, aligned with how the state narrates them. Other ways of understanding eavesdropping and visa regulations—for example as practices of a racializing project—are foreclosed. "The new State and Justice policies on visas and the monitoring of communications between suspected terrorists and their lawyers highlighted the problem of trying to reconcile growing national security concerns with traditional civil liberties issues." Rather than reporting the government's view, the authors seem to adopt the government's view that when civil liberties need to be reconciled with security, security must be prioritized. The loss of the reporters' autonomous positionality transforms the government's view into objective imperative—justifying the targeting of "risky" racialized communities.

Neil A. Lewis's January 9, 2002, piece, "I.N.S. to Focus on Muslims Who Evade Deportation," discusses government efforts to track and deport men from "Muslim and Middle Eastern countries that have Al Qaeda presences." Lewis offers quotes from both advocates and critics of profiling practices. At a key moment, in which one of Lewis's sources defends profiling, Lewis suggests that profiling cannot be condemned across the board:

Before Sept. 11, the merest hint of using profiles to screen for potential wrongdoers was widely regarded as a violation of some elementary American value. But the debate has become more complex.

"Profiling is not a four-letter word," said Victoria Toensing, a lawyer in Washington and a former senior Justice Department official.

Ms. Toensing said in an interview that it was naïve to think that the national or ethnic characteristics of Al Qaeda terrorists should not be taken into account in some fashion.

"It's Al Qaeda that has profiled by choosing principally radical Muslims, mostly from Middle Eastern countries," she said. "Prioritizing by looking at males who come from countries where there is support for Al Qaeda is common-sensical."

By suggesting that profiling "has become more complex," that it may not contradict any American values, Lewis undermines anti-profiling arguments framed in patriotic rhetoric. Lewis posits a pre-September 11/post-September 11 temporal dichotomy, whereby profiling is marked as more condemned prior to

September 11, 2001, but too "complex" to be flatly criticized after then. Deploying September 11, 2001, as a temporal marker, marking that date as an event, Lewis insinuates that there is and should be changes in profiling practices and in attitudes toward those practices. Indicating the necessity of a shift effaces the genealogy of profiling. Before September 11, police engaged widely in racial, religious, and national profiling. These practices went unnoticed or uncontested by large segments of the U.S. population, while many people from profiled communities and their allies waged an ongoing struggle against police profiling, violence, and harassment. By ignoring the history of profiling and protest against profiling, while implying that profiling was generally condemned in the U.S. before September 11, 2001, Lewis imagines a pre-September 11, 2001, consensus grounding a post-September 11, 2001 consensus. This notion exemplifies the differentialist moment Etienne Balibar describes, in which antiracism is marked as an abstraction that must be analyzed and transcended (1991, 22–23). By proposing that everyone agreed racial profiling was bad before, but now it is "more complex," Lewis gives the impression that lessons from racial conflict have allowed for a moment in which good and necessary religious and racial profiling can be distinguished from bad religious and racial profiling.

Ira Berkow's February 21, 2003, article, "Rower with Muslim Name Is an All-American Suspect," argues for a necessary type of profiling. It implicitly criminalizes Arab Americans by casting them against African Americans with Muslim names. Newark Port Authority stopped Aquil Abdullah, a Catholic African American rower, whose father is a convert to Islam. "Abdullah was on a no-fly list. 'What this means,' Andrew Kurpat, a police officer with the Port Authority in Newark, explained yesterday, 'is that anyone with a common Muslim name has to be checked out, to see if it's an alias, to see if he's on a terrorist list.'" Berkow states, "He was no terrorist." Berkow carefully distinguishes Abdullah from others whom authorities might profile:

There are a few things that set Abdullah apart from someone with another common Muslim name like Muhammad or Hussein. One is that he is the only black man to win either a national single sculls rowing championship or a race at the prestigious Henley Royal Regatta in England. . . . Another difference is that Abdullah was not even his name at birth. He was born in Washington with the name Aquilbn Michael X. Shumate. When his father, Michael Shumate, converted to Islam when Aquil was 6, he changed his and his son's last

name to Abdullah. . . . "Here's a guy representing his country in athletics and he's as American as you can get."

We are further told that Abdullah is "not a member of any mosque," but is "Catholic, actually." Abdullah's racial identity, professional athleticism on behalf of the United States, birth name, and Catholic faith qualify him as "All-American" and set him apart from other people with Muslim names. What might be the characteristics of those Muslims we are to think more worthy of policing? Berkow begs this question, and Abdullah opines:

And if he were on an airplane with someone with Arab characteristics, how would [Abdullah] feel? "I would raise an eyebrow and get a good look at who he was, and check out what he was doing," he said. "But I know I'd feel a sense of shame, too, because I know the feeling of being followed by a detective in a department store because of assumptions he made because I was black. The issue is terribly conflicting for me."

Even as he is himself profiled, Abdullah subscribes to a regime of surveillance that positions Arab Americans as suspect through the construction of an imagined Arab phenotype. (It is important to ask the question: what is an "Arab characteristic"? Is it possible to even speak of such a thing, given the range of embodied subjects that get designated under the sign "Arab"?) Moreover, Abdullah accepts the legitimacy of the policing apparatus that interpellates him as a subject in need of policing, and he even goes as far as to call for an increase in the efficiency with which profiling is executed: "I can understand the concern," Abdullah said recently with a graceful, disarming demeanor and an easy smile. "It's legitimate, of course, and some of my friends are angrier about the name profiling than I am, but I do wish the authorities could be quicker about the check."

Abdullah is positioned precariously between Arab Muslim Americans and Americans not of Muslim or Arab descent. As an African American, a member of a non-Arab group that has dealt with police profiling for years, and as a person with a Muslim name who faces religious profiling, Abdullah's rendition of events can function as a go-ahead for profiling. That is, Berkow's article constructs a discourse that speaks a subject—Abdullah—that gives consent to, justifies, and forgives discriminatory police practices. Berkow offers a quote

from Abdullah himself excusing harassment, making racialized citizenship seem acceptable—especially if a racially black man approves. Complicity with disciplinary technologies marks Abdullah as a model subject, one who accepts racial and religious policing, even if he is targeted by it. This racialized citizen monitors Arabs, who may be subordinated even to racialized citizens. While it may appear that Abdullah's status as a member of the national community is confirmed as "all-American," it is only awkwardly so, for he has been and can be subjected to profiling; he is comparable to Arabs and Muslims, but not quite them.

Although media representations portray them as high-risk citizens, Arab Americans and Muslim Americans are not only increasingly targeted by police violence but face ongoing vigilante violence as well. Blaine Harden's September 14, 2001, piece, "For Many, Sorrow Turns to Anger and Talk of Vengeance," rehearsing racist speech directed at Muslims and people of Arab descent in the immediate wake of September 11, 2001, aggressively mobilizes the category "American" to back a discourse of revenge:

More than a few Americans are beginning to obsess about how to get even.

Phil Beckwith, a retired truck driver, announced his modest proposal for avenging the attacks on New York and Washington. . . . "I know just what to do with these Arab people," . . . "We have to find them, kill them, wrap them in a pigskin and bury them. That way they will never go to heaven."

Here, the proposal to murder "Arab people" predicated the generic invocation of the word "American." If "more than a few Americans" constitutes the group of people considering acts of vengeance, and the group of people against whom revenge is sought is named as "Arab," then the two categories appear to stand at odds. Racialization inscribes the logic of this call for violent revenge through a religious trope. The demand that Arabs be "wrap[ped] in a pigskin" no doubt attempts to reference the Islamic injunction to Muslims not to eat pork. This is a particularly pertinent example of a racial project, inasmuch as it relies on modes of racial knowing that signify the body and culture, in order to propose specific acts of physical and psychological violence.

While Blaine Harden's piece gives extensive space to racist articulations such as that, it contains five sentences that describe or cite antiwar sentiments, and it offers no critiques of racism. With no counterbalance, the article presents

graphically violent language that is overwhelmingly racially inflected. The excitement of a drive to violence is articulated within the frame of patriotism: "Eager to do something, anything, to relieve their frustration, Americans today bought guns and ammunition, inquired about military service, planned patriotic celebrations for the weekend and let their anger run loose in conversation." If Americans are those who are buying weapons, flocking to the military, expressing an angry nationalism, we must ask who falls outside the nation, who is not allowed in this category, and how this economy of violent Americanness is racially inscribed. Harden's description of Americans as ready "to relieve their frustration" suggests that people committing or preparing to commit racist acts in the name of the nation are suffering and deserve sympathy; they are the ones that count as true Americans. The feelings of those who experience racist violence are not taken into consideration. Indeed, Harden's article replicates the ideology of the violence it reports. Although Harden is quoting others who are not affiliated with *NYT*, the article carries and distributes the violent impact of the words it quotes. The article actively organizes the national community around a racialized discourse of violent vengeance. Insofar as the article, as representational text, actually makes an impact structurally through wording, it evidences what Etienne Balibar refers to as "an essential dissymmetry within the racist complex, which confers upon its acts and 'actings out' undeniable primacy over its doctrines, naturally including within the category of actions not only physical violence and discrimination, but words themselves, the violence of words in so far as they are acts of contempt and aggression" (Balibar 1991, 18). In this sense, the article itself, though there is no direct evidence of the author's intention, is a racial project through and through; it represents, explains, and interprets, and the force of its discourse has the capacity to reproduce and alter social structural relations.

As might be said of all racial discourse, Harden's text is sexualized; it bears the imprint of racial violence and meaning production at the center of U.S. history, in that it calls forth a racialized imagery of rape and mob violence:

"Attempting to parse this situation with the sort of legality you might find during a rape trial is not appropriate here," said Paul D. Danish, a county commissioner in Boulder, Colo. The United States, Mr. Danish said, should order a handful of Arab nations—including Afghanistan and Iraq—to hand over responsible parties. "If they do not comply, we should declare war," he said. "My interest is only in seeing them change their behavior or in seeing their destruction."

The trope "rape" is deployed here to make an argument for extralegal action. The explanatory logic of the "rape" trope proposes a course of action based on experiences of gendered racial conflict in U.S. history. In the post-reconstruction United States, white mobs lynched thousands of black men, who they claimed had raped white women. Lynch mobs acted extralegally, but with the tacit and active support of law. The calling forth of this imagery in the article positions the nation-state parallel to white women in the earlier discourse, and the avengers, all men (racially unmarked, but presumably white), occupy the same position as they did in the earlier discourse, only here Arab and Muslim peoples and states are subjected to vigilante and military force working in conjunction.

Harden's article relays a discourse of revenge that constitutes its targets through a discursive slippage between Osama bin Laden, predominantly Arab and Muslim nations, and people of Arab or South Asian descent. Descriptions of actual and possible violence begin with brutal bodily assault and segue to military warfare on a massively destructive scale to premeditated and anxious public violence within the U.S. against racialized citizens:

"If I could get my hands on bin Laden, I'd skin him alive and pour salt on him," said Bruce Cristina, 45, a worker at Ogden Metalworking. "Nothing would be cruel enough." . . . "Level the country that's harboring them," he said. "The whole country." . . . "I'll be honest with you," said Burnie Stokes, the shop's owner. "I'll see somebody that's Arabic, Pakistani or Indian, I'm looking at him like, 'What the hell do you have under your coat?'"

Brutal descriptions of imagined bodily mutilation are accompanied and reinforced by incitements to fight for the armed forces of the state, as Harden narrates:

So far, at least, the attacks on Tuesday have had "minimal impact" on the number of people volunteering for the armed forces, said Douglas Smith, spokesman for the Army Recruiting Command in Fort Knox, Ky.

But Mr. Smith said that recruiting stations around the country had received a higher than usual number of calls from veterans who wanted to know if they can do anything.

Using the operative words "so far," Harden prophesies future military growth and mobilization. Harden's sympathies are revealed when he gives the space to

quote "one of the few young people to respond to recent events by trying to join the Army": "Everybody was talking about Pearl Harbor, and that made me think of my grandfather," said Mr. Stuart, who is unemployed. "The very day after, he told his family he wanted to go into the military. I couldn't get that out of my mind." Calling forth the memory of Pearl Harbor, a sequence of events is brought to mind that might suggest a course of action for contemporary events, making mob violence, internment, and bombing campaigns feasible possibilities.

Finally, these actions are celebrated and affirmed within the boundaries of the national space:

In Riverton, Wyo., the town where Mr. Beckwith made his proposal about Arabs and pigskins this week, most of the town was expected to turn out on Friday night for homecoming ceremony before the high school football game.

During the national anthem, everyone at the game will be expected to stand and hold up a version of the American flag that was printed in the local newspaper.

The spectacle of national unity with violence against people of Arab descent caps the article and suggests future actions in the name of the nation. A caption to a photograph accompanying Harden's article evidences the results: "A masked man fired 21 shots at Hassan Awdah on Wednesday as Mr. Awdah, a Yemeni American, stood behind a bulletproof-glass window at his gasoline station in Gary, Ind."

CONCLUSION

As African American poet June Jordan wrote, following her visit to Lebanon in April 1996 after Israel invaded and killed more than 100 civilians in the United Nations camp at Qana, "Arab peoples and Arab Americans occupy the lowest, the most reviled spot in the racist mind of America. . . . I believe that to be Muslim and to be Arab is to be a people subject to the most uninhibited, lethal bullying possible" (1996, 13). Major U.S. print news media, it appears from our research, have contributed to the uninhibited bullying of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans through misrepresentations that are hard to explain away coming from such leading respected liberal newspapers as the *New York Times*. It is not necessary for us to argue intentionality on the part of individual reporters or the

NYT as a representational apparatus to make the argument of the damage that such misrepresentation does to the civil liberties, rights, and active citizenship of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. Nor is it necessary to cull the assertions about Arab and Muslim noncitizens living in the U.S. from statements made specifically about Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. Indeed, the argument of this chapter is precisely that these misrepresentations question the possibility that persons could be Arab and American, Muslim and American. Thus the conflation of citizen and noncitizen Arabs and Muslims and the insidious linking of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans to a demonized Islam and Muslims globally has the concerted effect of casting doubt on the Americanness of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. This elision between Arab Americans and Muslim Americans and what is represented as "fanatical," "violent," "terrorist," U.S.-hating Muslims around the world, has set the stage for surveillance, policing, harassment, and incarceration. Although we do not suggest that such state-deployed disciplinary practices will be eliminated by more accurate representations of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, we argue that legitimate, respected newspapers must be accountable for their contributions to the larger array of racializing projects. The results of this survey call for a reckoning by print news media that pride themselves on standing up against racism.